A PROPOSAL TO RESTRICT THE PATENT LAW
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS WHILE A
STATUTORY REMEDY IS AVAILABLE
Eric J. Faragi∗
INTRODUCTION
The patent law doctrine of equivalents, a judicially created
doctrine of relief, allows a plaintiff to succeed in a patent
infringement action even though the accused infringer has not
1
literally infringed the plaintiff’s patent. In such a case, the court will
find infringement if the defendant’s potentially infringing subject
2
matter is equivalent to what the patentee claims. The doctrine
effectively allows the patentee to broaden the patent claim beyond its
literal scope to include subject matter that performs “substantially the
same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result
3
as the claimed subject matter.” This has the potential of broadening
the patentee’s monopoly and the scope of protection beyond the
4
initial intentions set forth in the patent application.
There are dangers, however, associated with the doctrine of
5
equivalents—most notably, the uncertainty that the doctrine creates.
Generally speaking, courts should limit infringement to literal
6
infringement when possible. Such a limitation is consistent with
recent case law from the United States Court of Appeals for the
7
Federal Circuit, which has emphasized the need to narrow a
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Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853). Winans is the first Supreme Court
case shaping the doctrine of equivalents. Id. For a discussion of the establishment of
the doctrine of equivalents, see infra notes 40-66 and accompanying text.
2
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1952).
3
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.04 (2d ed. 1999).
4
Id.
5
See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 614-18 (Black, J., dissenting).
6
See infra notes 156-204 and accompanying text.
7
The Federal Circuit is the appeals court for all patent cases. Holmes Group v.
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002).
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patentee’s rights in cases involving the doctrine of equivalents. This
Comment proposes another mechanism which courts may utilize to
narrow the rights of a patentee wishing to use the doctrine of
equivalents. Particularly, where the patentee has specific knowledge
of a non-literal infringement and willfully does not seek a reissue, the
courts should not permit the patentee to appeal to the doctrine of
equivalents
In addition to being consistent with recent case law, one can also
find support for limiting infringement to literal infringement in a
long-standing principle of American jurisprudence—a person cannot
9
appeal to equity when there is an adequate remedy at law. One
might classify the doctrine of equivalents as a remedy in equity
because a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
is similar to the equitable remedy of reformation (the jury is
essentially rewriting the existing claims in order to find infringement
10
The Federal Circuit has classified the
in a particular instance).
doctrine of equivalents as an “equitable remedy,” then at least by
analogy, the doctrine of equivalents should not be available when a
11
legal, statutory remedy is adequate and available.
This “inadequate remedy at law” rule has its roots in the English
court system, which was principally divided into the law courts and
12
the equity courts.
Law courts were rigid in their rules and
procedures, while the equity court was a separate court administered
13
by the Chancellor that was more flexible, and focused on fairness.
While the writ system and technical pleading rules of the law courts
compartmentalized disputes between parties, as they confined parties
8

See infra notes 156-204 and accompanying text.
Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 610 (E.D. La. 1999) (stating
“[i]njunctive relief is an appeal to this Court’s equity jurisdiction. . . . It is a
fundamental teaching of equity that injunctive relief is unavailable when the party
seeking relief has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if
the requested equitable relief is denied”) (citations omitted); East River Sav. Bank v.
Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 702 F. Supp. 448, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating
“[p]laintiff does not dispute the general proposition that equitable relief is
unavailable when there exists an adequate remedy at law. Moreover, an equitable
claim cannot proceed where the plaintiff has had and let pass an adequate
alternative remedy at law”) (citations omitted).
10
See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
11
Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 92-1090, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22941, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 10, 1992) (stating “[b]ut the doctrine of
equivalents is not an automatic second prong to every infringement charge. It is an
equitable remedy available only upon a suitable showing.”) (emphasis added).
12
LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE
12 (1997).
13
TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 12, at 12.
9
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to specific enumerated causes of action in order to obtain relief,
parties in equity petitioned the Chancellor to persuade him to relieve
them from the injustice that would occur from a strict application of
14
the remedies of common law. Equity thus grew to fill in the holes
left by substantive common law and to make a broader range of
15
remedies available.
The remedy at law was typically damages;
however, if the remedy sought was equitable (typically an injunction,
specific performance, rescission, or reformation), a plaintiff generally
16
had no choice but to bring the cause of action in equity court. The
17
common law courts operated as a “brake.” A plaintiff had to appeal
to the law courts first, as the courts developed a jurisdictional rule:
equity was only available when the remedy at law was unavailable or
18
inadequate. This did not mean that courts of equity would only
19
grant equitable relief. A court of equity could also award damages
as relief provided a plaintiff established equity jurisdiction because
20
the remedy sought at law was inadequate or unavailable.
Under current United States jurisprudence, the separate law and
21
equity courts have largely merged.
This merger, however, has
22
produced a dilemma. The inadequate remedy at law rule separated
23
the jurisdiction of the law and equity courts.
This rule also
24
controlled whether equitable remedies were available.
When
federal and state government legislatures merged the law and equity
courts, the legislatures did not provide direction about which rules
25
should control relief in equity. As a result, although a court that
14

Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 918 (1987).
15
Subrin, supra note 14, at 920.
16
TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 12, at 12. Common law courts did occasionally
grant equitable relief under the guise of “writ[s] of prohibition,” but equitable relief
for the most part only came from the equity courts. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 679 (5th ed. 1956).
17
Subrin, supra note 14, at 920.
18
TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 12, at 12.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 12-13.
22
Id.
23
See Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 739 F.2d 661, 668 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (stating “[o]f course, the general rule is that if there is an adequate remedy at
law, equitable relief is unavailable”) (citation omitted); Pageland 29 Ltd. P’ship v.
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 91-1858-LFO, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19231, at *13
(D.D.C. Nov. 2, 1993) (stating “[i]n addition, plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish
the lack of an adequate remedy at law. Absent such a showing, equitable relief is
unavailable”) (citations omitted).
24
TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 12, at 12-13.
25
Id. at 13.
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had both law and equity jurisdiction was now granting equitable
remedies, it generally only granted an equitable remedy when a legal
26
remedy was inadequate.
The Patent Act offers a patentee a specific legal remedy—the
27
reissue. Using this available legal remedy, a patentee can obtain a
28
reissue patent to expand the scope of his patent claims. This allows
the patentee to broaden his protection without relying on the court,
as long as he complies with the conditions of his available legal
29
remedy.
The doctrine of equivalents is therefore an available
judicially created remedy even when there is a remedy at law, and
many patent attorneys representing defendants have asked for its
30
elimination.
Rather than proposing a complete elimination of the doctrine of
equivalents, this Comment proposes limiting the doctrine of
equivalents in egregious cases. Particularly, where the patentee has
specific knowledge of a non-literal infringement and willfully does
not seek a reissue, the courts should not permit the patentee to
appeal to the doctrine of equivalents. Part I reviews the doctrine of
equivalents. Part II examines the Reissue Application and the
statutory rights and requirements associated with it. Part III
compares these two remedies. Part IV analyzes the trend toward a
narrowing of rights. Part V proposes restricting the doctrine of
equivalents in egregious cases.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
There are two types of patent infringement: literal infringement
31
or infringement by the doctrine of equivalents.
In literal
32
infringement, the invention “reads” on the patent claim. A patent

26

Id.
35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). A Reissue is an application filed for after the original
patent issues. Id. The purpose of a reissue is to correct an inadvertent mistake,
generally when the issued claims are too narrow or because the technology went in a
direction where the patentee seeks broader claims. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde
Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 615 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). The original
application must support the new claims. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
28
Id.
29
See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
30
See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21
(1997).
31
Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 318 F.3d 1143, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
32
“Reads” on a patent claim means “all limitations of the claim are found in the
reference, or ‘fully met’ by it.” Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 772
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
27
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33

claim defines the invention. It is analogous to a real property deed
that defines the metes and bounds of an estate holder’s real
34
property. In order to infringe a claim, an infringer must use every
35
single word in the claim. Consider the following claim to a chair:
A sitting device comprising:
1. Four supports; and
2. A horizontal member perpendicularly connected to the four
supports.

A chair with four or more legs will literally infringe this claim because
of the word “comprising,” a term of art, which means “including but
36
not limited to” or “at least.” A stool with three legs, however, will
not literally infringe this claim because three is not “at least” four.
The patentee, therefore, cannot assert a literal infringement claim
against a party using a sitting device with three legs. One must
determine what is truly the invention in this hypothetical. The
novelty of this arrangement can be either of the following: a specific
amount of legs (four) connected to a horizontal member; or the fact
that a horizontal member is connected to legs. If it is the latter, and a
competitor of the patentee sees the original claim to four legs and
then designs a device using three legs in order to circumvent the
claim, that competitor successfully avoids the patent claim but still
37
“practices,” or uses, the invention. When a defendant’s invention,
however, uses what is substantially the claimed invention, even
though it is not literally infringing, the courts permit the patentee to
38
sue under the doctrine of equivalents. In this instance, the doctrine
of equivalents would allow the patentee to sue if the court finds that
39
four is “equivalent” to three.
A. Establishment of the Doctrine of Equivalents
The first Supreme Court case shaping the doctrine of
40
equivalents was Winans v. Denmead. The invention at issue in Winans
involved railroad cars with circular rather than the traditional,
33

Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
See Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
35
Cedarapids, Inc. ex rel. El-Jay Div. v. Nordberg, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 1230, 1271
(N.D. Iowa 1995).
36
Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
37
“Practicing” means using the invention. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,
323 U.S. 386, 412 (1945).
38
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1952).
39
See id.
40
56 U.S. 330 (1853).
34
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41

rectangular walls. The problem with the rectangular walls of the
existing cars was that the stress on the walls caused them to break
42
when filled with coal or other heavy items.
The existing design
allowed the railroad cars to transport a maximum weight in coal that
equaled the weight of the car itself, while the patented design allowed
the railroad cars to transport a maximum weight in coal of at least
43
Plaintiff’s circular wall design reduced the
double that amount.
stress on the walls because the circular wall design supported the load
44
in every direction. The defendants in Winans made railroad cars
similar to those the plaintiff produced, with the following exception:
the defendant used walls of an octagonal shape rather than a circular
45
shape, to achieve similar stress reducing results.
The question
before the Court was whether the claims limited the patentee to
46
circular inventions, or whether octagonal designs infringed as well.
The Court held for the patentee finding that octagonal was
47
substantially similar, or “equivalent,” to circular in this circumstance.
The Supreme Court in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde
48
Air Products Co. set out the modern contours of the doctrine of
49
equivalents. The invention at issue in Graver Tank involved electric
arc welding and specific fluxes, and of particular importance to the
patentee was the ability to weld metal plates quickly with reliable
50
strength. The alleged infringer used a flux that was substantially
similar to that of the patentee, except that the alleged infringer used
a silicate with manganese, which was not an “alkaline earth metal” as
51
claimed by the patentee, rather than a silicate with magnesium. In
Graver Tank, the majority held that courts may consider one an
infringer if there is equivalence between elements of an accused
52
device and elements of the claimed invention.
Writing for the
majority, Justice Jackson explained that for courts to allow someone
41

Id. at 339.
Id.
43
Id. at 331.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 340.
46
Winans, 56 U.S. at 339.
47
Id. at 344. This Court rendered this verdict when patent applications used
“central claiming,” and as such, a patentee is entitled to the invention in every form
unless the patentee intended to disclaim such forms. See id. at 342; infra text
accompanying notes 81-85.
48
339 U.S. 605 (1952).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 610.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 612.
42
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to imitate a patented invention while leaving out merely minute
details would convert the protection the patent grant affords into “a
53
hollow and useless thing.” Justice Jackson further noted that this
kind of limitation would encourage an “unscrupulous copyist” to
make insignificant changes to his otherwise copied subject matter to
be take the copied subject matter outside the scope of the claims, and
54
hence leaving the patentee with no recourse under the law, because
a person seeking to copy an invention would normally introduce
55
some minor alterations in order to conceal the piracy. The Court
explained that without the doctrine of equivalents, it would have to
determine infringement in patent law by rules of form rather than
56
substance, and this would deprive a patentee of “the benefit of his
invention and would foster concealment rather than disclosure of
inventions, which is one of the primary purposes of the patent
57
system.” In this respect, the Court noted that the essence of the
doctrine of equivalents is to prevent the defendant from practicing a
58
fraud on the patent. As a result, when the defendant’s invention
performs substantially the same function, in substantially the same
way, producing substantially the same result, the court will find
59
infringement.
53

Id. at 607.
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. But see Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39
(1997) (finding that fraud on the patent is not the only reason to invoke the
doctrine of equivalents). Practicing a fraud on the patent means “making, using, or
selling a device which meets the test of equivalence when compared to a patented
invention but which avoids the claim language.” Coleco Indus. Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n., 573 F.2d 1247, 1254-55 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
59
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608. In a more recent case, however, Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 (1997), the Court changed the wording
of this equivalent infringement test. The Court stated:
In our view, the particular linguistic framework used is less important
than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry: Does the
accused product or process contain elements identical or equivalent to
each claimed element of the patented invention? Different linguistic
frameworks may be more suitable to different cases, depending on
their particular facts. A focus on individual elements and a special
vigilance against allowing the concept of equivalence to eliminate
completely any such elements should reduce considerably the
imprecision of whatever language is used. An analysis of the role
played by each element in the context of the specific patent claim will
thus inform the inquiry as to whether a substitute element matches the
function, way, and result of the claimed element, or whether the
substitute element plays a role substantially different from the claimed
element. With these limiting principles as a backdrop, we see no
54
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Courts designed the doctrine of equivalents to promote
60
When courts invoke the doctrine of equivalents, they
fairness.
essentially reform the claims of an existing patent claim to cover an
61
insubstantial change. The doctrine of equivalents is designed “to
relieve an inventor from a semantic strait jacket when equity requires,
it is not designed to permit wholesale redrafting of a claim to cover
62
non-equivalent devices.”
Courts have realized that “[l]iteral
adherence to the written claim in determining the scope of the
protection can invite unfair subversion of a valuable right, which
63
would substantially diminish the economic value of patents.”
64
Recently, in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., the
Supreme Court acknowledged that even a minor extension of
protection beyond the literal wording of a patent may create
substantial uncertainty about the point at which the patent monopoly
65
ends.
This uncertainty can hinder “a legitimate investment in
66
technology-based products and services.”
B. Arguments against the Doctrine of Equivalents
Many have argued that the doctrine of equivalents should not
even exist for at least four reasons. First, the doctrine is contrary to
67
the second paragraph of section 112 of the Patent Act. Second,
Congress implicitly rejected the doctrine by using the word
68
“equivalents” in the patent statute in another context. Third, courts
originally created the doctrine when patent applications used central

purpose in going further and micro-managing the Federal Circuit’s
particular word-choice for analyzing equivalence. We expect that the
Federal Circuit will refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in
the orderly course of case-by-case determinations, and we leave such
refinement to that court’s sound judgment in this area of its special
expertise.
Id. (emphasis added).
60
DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 874 (2d ed. 2001).
61
See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
62
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
63
CHISUM, supra note 60, at 874.
64
535 U.S. 722 (2002).
65
Id. at 727.
66
CHISUM, supra note 60, at 874.
67
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1952)
(Black, J., dissenting).
68
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25-26 (1997)
(discussing changes to 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 (1994)).
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70

claiming, a style of claiming that Congress overruled by statute.
71
Finally, a statutory remedy is available through the reissue.
Many, including Justice Black who dissented in Graver Tank, have
argued that the doctrine of equivalents is contrary to the second
paragraph of section 112 of the Patent Act, which provides that “an
applicant shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the part,
improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or
72
discovery.”
Justice Black reiterated that the patent statute
specifically requires a claim, and that a claim precisely defines the
73
invention and is something that a defendant infringes literally.
Justice Black explained “it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion
of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import
of its terms”. . . , and giving the “patentee the benefit of a grant that it
did not precisely claim is no less ‘unjust to the public’ and no less an
evasion of [the patent statute] merely because done in the name of
74
the ‘doctrine of equivalents.’”
A second argument against the doctrine is that the patent statute
75
uses the word “equivalents” in another context and thus Congress
76
implicitly rejected the doctrine. The courts through case law, rather
69

An example of a central patent claim is as follows: “I claim as my invention a
method substantially as shown and described in my patent application.” See Winans
v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 342 (1853).
70
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 27.
71
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 614-15 (Black, J., dissenting).
72
Id. at 613-14 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing the predecessor statute to 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 para. 2 (2000)).
73
Id. at 614 (Black, J., dissenting).
74
Id.
75
35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 (2000).
76
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27-28 (1997).
The 1952 Patent Act in section 112, paragraph 6 contains a “means for” claming
provision that incorporates the term “equivalents,” which is not contained in the
1870 Patent Act. Id. Under the new provision, an applicant can claim his invention
by the function it serves, instead of describing the element it uses (e.g., “a means of
connecting Part A to Part B,” rather than “a two-penny nail”). Id. The decision in
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946) prompted Congress to
enact section 112, paragraph 6. Id. In that case, the Court rejected patent claims
that do not particularly describe the invention but rather employ functional
language. Id. Although section 112, paragraph 6 now allows “means for” claims, the
patentee is not entitled to every conceivable “means” that will perform that function.
Id. at 28. Instead, the patentee is only entitled to those “means” disclosed in his
specification, or “equivalents” thereof. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28. The Court
noted that “[t]his is an application of the doctrine of equivalents in a restrictive role,
narrowing the application of broad literal claim elements. We recognized this type
of role for the doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank itself.” Id. Section 112,
paragraph 6, however, “is silent on the doctrine of equivalents as applied where there
is no literal infringement.” Id. The Court further explained:
Because § 112, ¶ 6 was enacted as a targeted cure to a specific problem,
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than Congress via statute, established the doctrine of equivalents. In
1952, Congress revised the Patent Act and added the term
78
“equivalents” with regard to a “means for” claim in the statute. At
that time, Congress knew that the courts were using a word such as
“equivalents,” but it did not include the doctrine of equivalents in the
79
patent statute. Thus, some argue that because Congress used the
word “equivalents” in other parts of the statute but remained silent
80
about a “doctrine” of equivalents, that the doctrine should not exist.
A third argument against the doctrine of equivalents is that
courts created it at a time when patent applications used “central
claiming” as opposed to distinct claims, which the patent statute
81
presently requires. A typical patent claim example during this time
was “I claim as my invention an apparatus substantially as shown and
82
described in my patent application.” A patentee was thus entitled to
83
whatever he included in his disclosure to the Patent Office. This
type of claim language was significantly less precise than, for
example, the aforementioned patent claim to a chair: “A sitting
device comprising: four supports; and a horizontal member
perpendicularly connected to the four supports.” In this example,
regardless of the types of chairs the applicant discloses in his patent
application, the current law limits his property right to specifically
84
what he includes in the patent claims. Because the patent statute
now requires distinct claims, as opposed to general “central claims,”
and because the reference in that provision to “equivalents” appears to
be no more than a prophylactic against potential side effects of that
cure, such limited congressional action should not be overread for
negative implications. Congress in 1952 could easily have responded to
Graver Tank as it did to the Halliburton decision. But it did not. Absent
something more compelling than the dubious negative inference
offered by petitioner, the lengthy history of the doctrine of equivalents
strongly supports adherence to our refusal in Graver Tank to find that
the Patent Act conflicts with that doctrine. Congress can legislate the
doctrine of equivalents out of existence any time it chooses. The various policy
arguments now made by both sides are thus best addressed to
Congress, not this Court.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
77
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28.
78
35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 (2000). For further discussion of the history of this
change, see supra note 76.
79
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28.
80
See id. See also discussion supra note 76 for the Supreme Court’s treatment of
this argument.
81
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 27.
82
See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 342 (1853).
83
See id.
84
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (2000).
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some argue that there is no longer a need for the doctrine of
85
equivalents.
A fourth argument against the doctrine of equivalents is that
Congress created a statutory remedy at law, the reissue, which should
86
supplant the doctrine. In Graver Tank, Justice Black pointed out
that the patentee has a remedy at law if the patent is wholly or partly
87
inoperative as a result of inadvertent errors of the patentee. If the
patent claims are too narrow as a result of an inadvertent error, the
88
patentee is not without a legal remedy. The patentee can go back to
the Patent Office, admit his mistake, and seek to broaden his claims
89
with a reissue. Thus, if the claims are too narrow, there is a statutory
90
method, not a judicially created method, to broaden the claims. If
Congress declared via the Patent Act that a patentee can only
broaden the claims within two years of the original patent grant, the
courts should not then permit broadening under the doctrine of
91
equivalents after this statutory time period has expired.
Although these arguments for eliminating the doctrine of
equivalents may seem appealing, the courts should not eliminate the
doctrine, but instead should limit its use in egregious cases. The
doctrine should not be available when the patentee has specific
knowledge of a non-literal infringement and willfully does not seek a
reissue.
85

See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 27.
See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
87
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 615-16 (1952)
(Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black explained:
Congress was careful to hedge the privilege of reissue by exacting
conditions. It also entrusted the Patent Office, not the courts, with
initial authority to determine whether expansion of a claim was
justified, and barred suits for retroactive infringement based on such
expansion.
Like the Court’s opinion, this congressional plan
adequately protects patentees from “fraud,” “piracy,” and “stealing.”
Unlike the Court’s opinion, it also protects business men from
retroactive infringement suits and judicial expansion of a monopoly
sphere beyond that which a patent expressly authorizes. The plan is
just, fair, and reasonable. In effect it is nullified by this decision
undercutting what the Court has heretofore recognized as wise
safeguards. One need not be a prophet to suggest that today’s
rhapsody on the virtue of the “doctrine of equivalents” will . . . make
enlargement of patent claims the “rule” rather than the “exception.”
Id. (citations omitted).
88
35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
89
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 615 (Black, J., dissenting).
90
See id.; 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
91
See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 615 (Black, J., dissenting). According to 35 U.S.C.
§ 251, a patentee has two years from the issue date of the patent to file for a reissue
to broaden the original claims. Id.
86
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II. THE REISSUE
The reissue, a statutory remedy that Congress originally created
in the 1870 Patent Act, permits the patentee to correct an inadvertent
mistake that would render the patent “wholly or partly inoperative or
92
invalid” after a patent issues. The patentee must have made the
93
mistake “through error without any deceptive intention.”
A
patentee whose patent issues with claims that are not sufficiently
broad is therefore not left without a remedy, as “inoperative or
invalid” in the statute covers the situation where the claims of the
94
patent are too narrow. Courts have held that a number of reasons
will satisfy the requirement of a “mistake” for purposes of the statute,
thus allowing the patentee to file a reissue application in the United
95
States Patent and Trademark Office to seek broader claims. These
reasons include the following: the patent attorney drafted the
application poorly, the attorney did not truly comprehend the
essence of the invention, the technology progressed in a direction
different than that which was anticipated by the patentee, or because
of some other inadvertent reason the claims in the issued patent are
96
simply too narrow.
A. Enablement in the context of a Reissue Patent
The important policy concerning a reissue application is harm
97
to the expectations of the public. A patentee seeking to broaden his
patent claims via a reissue may harm these expectations because the
public, including the patentee’s competitors, may have relied on the
98
original claim language in shaping their commercial behavior. A
patentee seeking a reissue must comply with the same relevant
provisions of the Patent Act as an inventor seeking a non-reissue

92

Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 353 (1881); see also 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
When filing a reissue application, the patentee must surrender his original patent
grant to the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000).
The reissue application, if it issues, will then issue with the prefix “RE” in front of the
patent number. 37 C.F.R. § 1.173 (2004).
93
35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
94
See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
95
Id. Of course, the original application must support these broader claims. Id.
96
Id.
97
CHISUM, supra note 60, at 129 (acknowledging that “an inventor who attempts
to broaden the scope of his claims through reissue may harm the public’s
expectations, including competitors of the patentee, who have relied on the original
claim language”).
98
Id.
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99

patent.
Thus, the reissue application must comply with sections
100
101
102
103
101, 102, 103, and 112 of the Patent Act. The first paragraph
of section 112 has three distinct requirements: written description,
104
best mode, and enablement.
The requirement of a written
description assures the public that the inventor is in full possession of
the invention prior to granting the patentee a monopoly on the
105
invention.
The inventor must disclose the best mode he
106
contemplated at the time of the patent application filing.
Most relevant to the doctrine of equivalents is the enablement
107
requirement.
For an application to satisfy the enablement
requirement, a person of ordinary skill in the art must be able to
108
make and use the invention “as broadly as it is claimed” without
109
“undue experimentation.”
The purpose of the enablement
requirement is to put the public on notice as to what the invention

99

Armstrong v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 179 F. Supp. 95, 97
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
100
35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that an invention must be useful to qualify for patent
protection. Id.
101
35 U.S.C. § 102 provides that an invention must be new to qualify for patent
protection. Id.
102
35 U.S.C. § 103 provides that an invention must be nonobvious to qualify for
patent protection. Id.
103
Armstrong, 179 F. Supp. at 97. 35 U.S.C. § 112 provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id. (emphasis added)
104
35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2000).
105
Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 434 (1822). Simply speculating on
what arrangement might work to achieve the intended results is not sufficient. See id.
106
35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2000). If the inventor contemplated a better mode,
yet concealed it from the public, the patent is invalid. See id.
107
See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
108
Nat’l Recovery Techs. Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys. Inc., 166 F.3d 1190,
1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
109
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The court stated:
Factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would
require undue experimentation . . . include (1) the quantity of
experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance
presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the
nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative
skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the
art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.
Id.
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110

actually is.
The broadest patent claim one can obtain in a reissue
(or a non-reissue) is therefore “equal to the scope of the
111
enablement.”
112
Suits brought under the
Any patent not enabled is invalid.
doctrine of equivalents, however, may have broadened patent claims
113
that the patent specification does not enable. Consider once again
the following claim to a chair:
A sitting device comprising:
1. Four supports; and
2. A horizontal member perpendicularly connected to the four
supports.

Assume also that the patent specification, drawings, and claims only
disclose a chair with four supports. Assume further that the patent
specification makes no mention of having more than four or less than
four supports, and that having less than four supports is not an
114
obvious improvement.
A competitor of the patentee may, seeing
this patent, avoid literal infringement by designing and
115
manufacturing a sitting device with three supports. Nowhere in the
patent had the patentee disclosed a member with less than four
supports. The competitor could not have been on notice that a
sitting device with three supports would infringe this patent. Yet, the
court could find infringement by the doctrine of equivalents if it
found that three is equivalent to four, even though the patentee had
never taught the public how to make and use a sitting device with
three supports. This defeats the purpose of section 112 of the Patent
Act—which prevents this type of uncertainty that the doctrine of
equivalents creates.
B. Intervening Rights in context of a Reissue Patent
When a patentee obtains a reissue, he must surrender the
116
original patent to the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
110

See Nat’l Recovery Techs., 166 F.3d at 1195-96.
Id. at 1196.
112
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
113
Case law is silent on whether the patent specification must enable an
“equivalent” claim under the doctrine of equivalents. See infra notes 147-50 and
accompanying text.
114
35 U.S.C. § 103 provides that nonobviousness is a condition for patentability.
Id.
115
The competitor could not manufacture a sitting device with four or more legs
because of the word “comprising.” See discussion supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
116
35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000).
111
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Since the patentee surrenders the original patent, courts, at one
117
point in history, acted as if it never even existed. This surrender of
the original patent precluded an infringement cause of action for
acts performed prior to the surrender because after the surrender,
118
no patent existed.
Further, courts would dismiss any suits filed
before the surrender of the original patent for failure to state a claim
119
on which relief could be granted.
To mitigate the harsh effect of the surrender, Congress
responded to the courts’ treatment of the original surrendered
patent by providing a form of continuity in certain circumstances if
the claims of the original are carried over and “identical” in the
120
reissue.
The statute requires the claims be identical in order to
121
relate back to the issue date of the original.
Mere similarity
between the claims in the reissue and the original is insufficient, as
122
the original claims are “dead.”
Liability for infringement of any
new or amended claims in the reissue, therefore, commences only
123
from the issue date of the reissue.
Congress has provided the patentee with a two-year window in
which the patentee is allowed to broaden the original claims of the
124
issued patent through the reissue process.
Even with this two-year
117

Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 827 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
35 U.S.C. § 252 para. 1 provides:
The surrender of the original patent shall take effect upon the issue of
the reissued patent, and every reissued patent shall have the same
effect and operation in law, on the trial of actions for causes thereafter
arising, as if the same had been originally granted in amended form,
but in so far as the claims of the original and reissued patents are
identical, such surrender shall not affect any action then pending nor
abate any cause of action then existing, and the reissued patent, to the
extent that its claims are identical with the original patent, shall
constitute a continuation thereof and have effect continuously from
the date of the original patent.
Id.
121
35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000). Consider an invention with three patent claims. If the
patentee is satisfied with the first claim, but decides the second and third claim are
wholly or partly inoperative, he can surrender the patent and seek a reissue to
broaden the scope of the second and third claims. See Seattle Box Co., 731 F.2d at 827.
When the reissue patent issues, if a person were practicing an invention that was
infringing the first claim when the original patent issued, the law will consider this
person an infringer as of the day the original patent issued as long as the first claim
in the reissue is identical to the first claim of the original patent. See id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
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limitation, however, a reissue can unsettle a competitor’s
125
The patentee’s competitor may have relied on the
expectations.
original claim language in shaping his commercial behavior and may
have capitalized on subject matter disclosed, but not claimed in the
126
original patent.
During the first two years of the original patent
term, the competitor may have made a significant investment “only to
127
have the reissue lay claim to this previously unoccupied area.”
Congress responded to this problem by creating the doctrine of
128
intervening rights, which guards against interference with a third
129
party’s expectations.
Under certain conditions, a reissue will not
affect certain rights of those who practiced the invention prior to the
130
issue date of the reissue.
As a result of practicing the invention
before the reissue was granted, “an infringer might enjoy a ‘personal
intervening right’ to continue what would otherwise be infringing
131
activity after reissue.” The rationale for the doctrine of intervening
rights is that the public, including competitors of the patentee,
obtains the right to use anything not claimed specifically in the
132
original patent. Although in certain circumstances a patentee may
recapture in a reissue subject matter dedicated to the public because
he inadvertently failed to include it in the claims of the original

125

Seattle Box Co., 731 F.2d at 827.
Id.
127
CHISUM, supra note 60, at 129.
128
35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000).
129
CHISUM, supra note 60, at 129.
130
Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 756 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 1985). The court summarized 35 U.S.C. § 252 para. 2 as follows:
(1) No reissued patent shall abridge or affect the right of any person or
his successors in business who made, purchased or used prior to the
grant of a reissue anything patented by the reissued patent, to continue
the use of, or to sell to others to be used or sold, the specific thing so
made, purchased or used, unless the making, using or selling of such
thing infringes a valid claim of the reissued patent which was in the
original patent. (2) The court before which such matter is in question
may provide for the continued manufacture, use or sale of the thing
made, purchased or used as specified, or for the manufacture, use or
sale of which substantial preparation was made before the grant of the reissue,
and it may also provide for the continued practice of any process
patented by the reissue, practiced, or for the practice of which
substantial preparation was made, prior to the grant of the reissue, to the
extent and under such terms as the court deems equitable for the
protection of investments made or business commenced before the grant of the
reissue.
Id. (emphasis in original).
131
Seattle Box Co., 756 F.2d at 1579.
132
Id.
126
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patent, he may not do so at the “expense of innocent parties.”
A
court may therefore permit a competitor to continue to practice an
invention claimed in a reissue if it determines that equity dictates this
134
result.
135
It has “the same
When a reissue issues, it is presumed valid.
effect and operation in law, on the trial of actions for causes
thereafter arising, as if the same had been originally granted in
136
amended form.”
Upon first glance, this language appears to
prevent courts from protecting intervening rights. The second
paragraph of section 252 of the Patent Act, however, modifies this
137
language to protect intervening rights. Further, when a defendant
properly raises the doctrine of intervening rights, courts fashion a
remedy using their broad equitable powers if circumstances
138
warrant. Courts have discretion to fashion the remedy from “a wide
139
range of options available” to them. If, however, the activity of the

133

Id.; see also Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Nat’l Nut Co., 310 U.S. 281, 293 (1940)
(allowing the defendant to continue to practice the invention that was later within
the scope of the reissue claims where the defendant built and operated its
equipment in a form that the original patent did not claim).
134
Seattle Box Co., 756 F.2d at 1579.
135
Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 829 (Fed. Cir.
1984); see also 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
136
35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000).
137
35 U.S.C. § 252 para. 2 provides:
A reissued patent shall not abridge or affect the right of any person or
that person’s successors in business who, prior to the grant of a reissue,
made, purchased, offered to sell, or used within the United States, or
imported into the United States, anything patented by the reissued
patent, to continue the use of, to offer to sell, or to sell to others to be
used, offered for sale, or sold, the specific thing so made, purchased,
offered for sale, used, or imported unless the making, using, offering
for sale, or selling of such thing infringes a valid claim of the reissued
patent which was in the original patent.
Id.
138
Seattle Box Co., 731 F.2d at 830. 35 U.S.C § 252 para. 2 provides:
The court before which such matter is in question may provide for the
continued manufacture, use, offer for sale, or sale of the thing made,
purchased, offered for sale, used, or imported as specified, or for the
manufacture, use, offer for sale, or sale in the United States of which
substantial preparation was made before the grant of the reissue, and
the court may also provide for the continued practice of any process
patented by the reissue that is practiced, or for the practice of which
substantial preparation was made, before the grant of the reissue, to
the extent and under such terms as the court deems equitable for the
protection of investments made or business commenced before the grant of the
reissue.
Id. (emphasis added).
139
Seattle Box Co., 731 F.2d at 830.
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defendant infringes a claim of the reissue that is identical to a claim
in the original, the defendant will find no protection under the
140
doctrine of intervening rights.
Consider once again the following
claim to a chair:
A sitting device comprising:
1. Four supports; and
2. A horizontal member perpendicularly connected to the four
supports.

Assume that a competitor of the patentee was manufacturing a sitting
device with three supports at the time this patent issues. If the
patentee seeks a reissue application to broaden his patent claim to
cover a sitting device with three supports, even if he is successful in
obtaining a reissue, the courts will allow the competitor of the
patentee to continue to manufacture the sitting device with three
supports because of the doctrine of intervening rights.
III. COMPARISON OF REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS TO THE REISSUE
The doctrine of equivalents and the reissue process coexist in
patent law. Just as there is “no fundamental inconsistency between
141
equity and common law,” there is no fundamental inconsistency
142
As
between the doctrine of equivalents and the reissue process.
such, “the availability of the reissue process [does] not vitiate the
viability of the doctrine of equivalents for products that do not
143
literally infringe a patent.”
The patentee frequently uses both the
doctrine of equivalents and the reissue process to broaden claims in
144
order to capture subject matter not covered by the original claims.
The doctrine of equivalents, however, need not duplicate the patent
145
statute’s method of correcting errors in claims.
A. Enablement in the context of the Doctrine of Equivalents
Whether or not a patent must enable an equivalent claim is not
146
clear, as case law is silent on this matter.
Wilson Sporting Goods v.
140

Id.
PLUCKNETT, supra note 16, at 679.
142
See Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Bremer, 958 F. Supp. 1347, 1356 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
143
Id. at 1356 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 25-26 (1997)).
144
See Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d 1420, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
145
Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1059 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (Rader, J, concurring).
146
See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
141
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147

David Geoffrey & Associates prevents the doctrine of equivalents from
148
The “equivalent
expanding claim scope to embrace prior art.
claims” therefore must comply with sections 102 and 103 of the
149
Patent Act, but the court was silent on compliance with the
150
enablement requirement of section 112.
The benefit to the patentee of circumventing the enablement
requirement is that the patentee potentially can obtain broader
coverage than he could have using the legal remedy of a reissue
application, because a reissue must comply with the same relevant
151
portions of the Patent Act as a non-reissue application.
In an
egregious case such as when the patentee had knowledge of the
infringing activity and did not seek a reissue, the law should strictly
confine the patentee to the claim scope he would be able to obtain by
a reissue application.
The entire purpose of section 112 of the Patent Act is to put the
public on notice as to what the patentee is claiming as his
152
invention. By permitting a suit under the doctrine of equivalents in
a case where the patentee knows that literal infringement does not
exist, the courts are allowing the patentee to circumvent the
153
enablement requirement. This could lead to more unfairness than
the injustice the doctrine of equivalents itself seeks to solve, as a
patentee who did not draft claims as broadly as he should have, may
in this instance make an assertion of infringement with “equivalent
claims” that he did not enable. The law should force a patentee in an
egregious case to avail himself of his adequate legal remedy of the
reissue, prior to permitting him to seek a judicially created remedy
through the doctrine of equivalents. Alternatively, courts should
require equivalent claims under the doctrine of equivalents to meet
the enablement requirement of section 112.
B. Intervening Rights in the context of the Doctrine of Equivalents
Although Congress has granted certain statutory protections to
an infringer of claims of a reissued patent that were not identical to
claims in the original patent, no such statute exists to protect
someone held liable as an infringer under the doctrine of
147

904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Id. at 683.
149
Id.
150
Case law is silent on compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112. See id. at 684.
151
See Armstrong v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 179 F. Supp. 95, 97
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
152
Athletic Alternatives v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
153
See discussion infra note 164.
148
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154

equivalents.
In fact, if courts determine that one is infringing
under the doctrine of equivalents, they are free to enjoin the
infringer from practicing the invention at all, even though the
infringer may have invested significant resources into practicing an
155
invention he did not literally infringe. When a patentee knows that
a potential non-literal infringer is relying on his patent and is shaping
his commercial behavior around it, the law should force the patentee
to broaden his claim through a reissue application. Alternatively, the
courts should provide for the same statutory intervening rights as
those that are afforded an infringer of a reissue patent.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TREND TOWARD NARROWING OF A PATENTEE’S
RIGHTS
The Federal Circuit has demonstrated a trend toward narrowing
a patentee’s rights, primarily in applying remedies that are equitable
156
in nature.
First, the doctrine of equivalents may not be used to
157
cover prior art. Second, the patentee cannot under the doctrine of
equivalents obtain patent coverage to material disclosed in the patent
158
Third, prosecution
specification but not claimed as his invention.
159
history estoppel applies to patent claims amended during the
160
prosecution of the patent.
Fourth, the defense of laches still
161
Fifth, courts will
applies to long delays in patent prosecution.
construe patent claims narrowly when the claim language is
162
ambiguous.
This narrowing of rights is consistent with the
154

See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000).
A court using its equitable powers would decide this, but the application could
be inconsistent in the absence of a statute on point. See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31
F.3d 1092, 1097 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting possible inconsistencies in court
construction of statutes absent congressional guidance).
156
Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1056-59 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (Rader, J., concurring).
157
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684
(Fed. Cir. 1990). A reference which would render a prospective invention as being
not “new” is “prior art” under 35 U.S.C. § 102, while a reference which would render
an invention as being “obvious” is “prior art” under 35 U.S.C. § 103. See Wilson
Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684.
158
Johnson & Johnston Assocs., 285 F.3d at 1054-55.
159
“Prosecution history” refers to the “public record of the patent proceedings,”
such as the original as-filed patent application, correspondence to and from the
Patent Office during the pendency of the application, and changes to the patent
application during the proceedings. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727-28 (2002).
160
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997).
161
Symbol Techs. Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
162
Athletic Alternatives v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
155
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proposition that, in an egregious case, when a patentee knows of the
non-literal infringement and willfully does not seek his legal remedy
of a reissue, the remedy under the doctrine of equivalents should be
163
unavailable.
The first example of the narrowing of a patentee’s rights is that a
patentee may not use the doctrine of equivalents to broaden claims
164
to the point where the equivalent claims would cover prior art. In
165
Wilson Sporting Goods, the court admitted that determining whether
or not “prior art restricts the range of equivalents of what is literally
claimed can be a difficult question to answer,” and that visualizing a
hypothetical claim often helps conceptualize the “limitation on the
166
scope of equivalents.” The real question is whether the Patent and
Trademark Office would have originally allowed the claim when the
167
patent issued in light of the prior art. If not, the patentee cannot
168
broaden coverage under the doctrine of equivalents. If the Patent
and Trademark Office would have allowed the claim, then courts may
169
find infringement under the doctrine.
As the Wilson Sporting Goods Court suggested visualizing a
hypothetical claim, consider again the hypothetical patent claim
previously discussed:
A sitting device comprising:
1.Four supports; and
2.A horizontal member perpendicularly connected to the four
supports.

If at the time of this patentee’s filing, a sitting device with two
supports existed in the public domain, the patentee will not be
allowed to broaden his claim through the doctrine of equivalents (or
170
a reissue) to include a claim to one support.
In this instance, the
patentee could only broaden his claim to read “three supports”
171
because that is not excluded by the prior art.
Another example of the narrowing of rights is that, similar to a
reissue application, a patentee through the doctrine of equivalents
163

See infra notes 164-204 and accompanying text.
Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684. This applies to 35 U.S.C. § 102 and 35
U.S.C. § 103, which the court referred to as “prior art.” Id. The court was silent
regarding 35 U.S.C. §112. See id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684.
169
Id.
170
See id.
171
See id.
164
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may not obtain coverage of subject matter disclosed but not claimed
172
as his invention after the patent issue. As early as 1881, in the case
of a reissue, courts have treated subject matter disclosed but not
173
claimed as in the public domain.
This issue was unsettled until
2002 in the case involving the doctrine of equivalents, where the
court applied the same rule in Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Service
174
Co. In Johnson & Johnston, the invention at issue involved metal foils
175
used to manufacture printed circuit boards. The patentee disclosed
in his specification that aluminum was the preferred material, but
176
other metals such as stainless steel or nickel alloys were usable. The
patentee, however, specifically limited the claims of the patent to “a
177
sheet of aluminum” and “the aluminum sheet.”
The court held,
“[h]aving disclosed without claiming the steel substrates, Johnston
cannot now invoke the doctrine of equivalents to extend its
aluminum limitation to encompass steel. Thus, Johnston cannot
assert the doctrine of equivalents to cover the disclosed but
178
unclaimed steel substrate.”
A further example of the narrowing of rights is that a patentee
cannot recapture via the doctrine of equivalents any subject matter
179
that he surrendered during the patent prosecution history.
In a
180
recent case, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., the
172

Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir.
2002). In the case of a reissue, a patentee can later claim subject matter he failed to
claim provided it was inadvertent and meets the other criteria of 35 U.S.C. § 251. Id.
173
Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350 (1881). The Court stated “the claim of a
specific device or combination, and an omission to claim other devices or
combinations apparent on the face of the patent, are, in law, a dedication to the public
of that which is not claimed.” Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
174
285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The court noted:
A patentee who inadvertently fails to claim disclosed subject matter,
however, is not left without remedy. Within two years from the grant of
the original patent, a patentee may file a reissue application and
attempt to enlarge the scope of the original claims to include the
disclosed but previously unclaimed subject matter. 35 U.S.C. § 251
(2000). In addition, a patentee can file a separate application claiming
the disclosed subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000) (allowing
filing as a continuation application if filed before all applications in the
chain issue). Notably, Johnston took advantage of the latter of the two
options by filing two continuation applications that literally claim the
relevant subject matter.
Id.
175
Id. at 1048-49.
176
Id. at 1055.
177
Johnson & Johnston Assocs., 285 F.3d at 1055.
178
Id.
179
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997).
180
Id.
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Supreme Court reiterated this principle. The invention at issue in
182
Because
Warner-Jenkinson involved a technique for purifying dyes.
the patent examiner cited some prior art involving a pH greater than
nine, the attorney for the patentee amended the claim to contain a
183
pH of six to nine.
The infringer used a chemical with a pH of
184
five. The Court found no literal infringement because five was not
185
within the claimed range of six to nine. Thus, the question before
the Court was whether amending a claim barred the patentee from
186
broadening that claim under the doctrine of equivalents.
The
Court held that the burden is on the patentee to establish the reason
187
for amendment. Prosecution history estoppel will “bar” the use of
the doctrine of equivalents for any amendment related to
patentability, and only under special circumstances, can the
188
presumption be rebutted.
Although the Federal Circuit in a later
189
case interpreted Warner-Jenkinson as an “absolute bar” to application
of the doctrine of equivalents, the Supreme Court reconfirmed its
“rebuttable presumption” holding of Warner-Jenkinson in Festo Corp. v.
190
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.
This changed the “absolute
bar” standard the Federal Circuit attempted to implement back to a
191
“foreseeable bar” standard.
Consider the sitting device invention once again:

181

Id. at 33.
Id. at 21-22.
183
Id. at 22.
184
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 23.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 30-32.
187
Id. at 33.
188
Id. at 33-34. In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
740-41 (2002), the Court summarized the circumstances where the presumption can
be rebutted:
182

There are some cases, however, where the amendment cannot
reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular equivalent. The
equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the
application; the rationale underlying the amendment may bear
no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question;
or there may be some other reason suggesting that the patentee
could not reasonably be expected to have described the
insubstantial substitute in question.
Id.
189

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
190
535 U.S. 722 (2002).
191
Id. at 740-41.
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A sitting device comprising:
1.Two supports; and
2.A horizontal member perpendicularly connected to the two
supports.

If the patent examiner cited prior art with two supports and the
patentee then amended his claim to read “four supports,” that
amendment would presumptively bar the patentee from using the
doctrine of equivalents to obtain coverage for “three supports,” even
192
if no prior art existed with three supports.
The Federal Circuit further narrowed a patentee’s rights in
193
Symbol Technologies Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, where the patentee “sat”
194
on those rights. In Lemelson, the patents at issue involved machine
vision systems and identification technology and were allegedly
195
entitled to a priority filing date of two patent applications filed in
196
1954 and 1956, more than forty years before the filing of the suit. If
the patentee established this priority date, nearly every bar code
197
scanner used in the United States would infringe these patents.
The issue on appeal was whether the equitable doctrine of laches was
198
a valid defense to infringement. The court held that laches was an
available defense to “bar enforcement of patent claims that issued
after an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution even
199
though the applicant complied with pertinent statutes and rules.”
Another example of the trend toward the narrowing of a
patentee’s rights occurred in Athletic Alternatives v. Prince
200
Manufacturing,
where the Federal Circuit applied a narrower
meaning to an ambiguous term in a patent rather than a broader

192

See id. at 740.
277 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
194
Id. “Sits on his rights” in this context is referring to a patentee who had
knowledge of infringing activity but did not bring action early enough. See id. at
1363.
195
The priority filing date is the date a patent becomes prior art as against all
other later inventions. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 6.02 (2d ed. 1999).
196
Lemelson, 277 F.3d at 1363.
197
See id. Prior to June 8, 1995, the term of a utility patent was 17 years from
issuance. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000). Since these patents had not issued until
approximately 1998, they were still valid despite the parent applications’ filing dates
of 1954 and 1956. See Lemelson, 277 F.3d at 1363. Since applications were kept in
secret until issued (now, until published), manufactures and users could not have
known of the filed patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000).
198
Lemelson, 277 F.3d at 1363.
199
Id. at 1363, 1366.
200
73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
193
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201

meaning.
The invention at issue in Athletic Alternatives involved a
method for stringing tennis racquets, and the court had to decide
which interpretation of the phrase “varies between” to utilize in
202
construing a claim against the defendant. The court reasoned that
if it allowed Athletic to assert the broader meaning of “varies
between,” the court would be undermining the “fair notice function
of the requirement that the patentee distinctly claim the subject
matter disclosed in the patent from which he can exclude others
203
temporarily.” The court explained that “[w]here there is an equal
choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a claim, and
there is an enabling disclosure that indicates that the applicant is at
least entitled to a claim having the narrower meaning, we consider
the notice function of the claim to be best served by adopting the
204
narrower meaning.”
V. PROPOSAL FOR RESTRICTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
The Federal Circuit has demonstrated a tendency to restrict the
205
application of the doctrine of equivalents.
Accordingly, even
though the Supreme Court overturned the Federal Circuit’s absolute
bar standard of using the doctrine when the patentee has amended a
206
patent claim to a foreseeable bar standard, the Federal Circuit has
construed the Festo holding of the Supreme Court narrowly and
continues to further restrict the application of the doctrine of
207
equivalents. The Federal Circuit should also restrict the doctrine of
equivalents where a patentee with specific knowledge of defendant’s
non-literal infringement willfully does not file a reissue. In such an
egregious case, the courts should not allow the patentee to appeal to
the doctrine of equivalents because he already has a remedy at law.
In Lemelson, the court found that the defense of laches was still
applicable as a defense to patent enforcement in cases of the
208
patentee’s unreasonable delay in prosecuting the application.
Likewise, if Congress changed the law so that seeking a broadening
reissue, while available, was a prerequisite for filing suits under the
doctrine of equivalents, the patentee who waits so that he falls outside
201

Id. at 1581.
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
See supra notes 156-204 and accompanying text.
206
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740-41
(2002).
207
See supra notes 156-204 and accompanying text.
208
Lemelson, 277 F.3d at 1368.
202
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of the two-year window for broadening claims via a reissue is also
exhibiting unreasonable delay, and the courts should not permit him
209
to appeal to the doctrine of equivalents.
Simply changing the two-year limitation on broadening patent
claims will not solve the issue, although it could offer some
210
Such a change, however, could create evidentiary
assistance.
problems. By having the time limit for broadening claims exceed two
years, the situation can arise where many “infringers” can contend
they relied on the original patent claims in some instances fifteen
years earlier to shape their behavior, and as such should be entitled
to intervening rights. This could easily become administratively
infeasible, as courts could potentially have to adjudicate and grant
intervening rights to many different infringers.
Finally, some may argue that the doctrine of equivalents is not
an “equitable” remedy, but merely another legal remedy, albeit a
judicially created one where courts construe the infringement statute
broadly, and as such, the general rule of appealing to the law before
211
equity should not apply. Under this argument, since a jury decides
questions of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, rather
than a judge as in an equity court, the doctrine is still a legal
212
remedy. The argument continues: if the doctrine of equivalents is a
legal remedy, a plaintiff should be entitled to select whichever legal
remedy he seeks (i.e., sue under the doctrine of equivalents, or
reissue and sue by literal infringement) just as he chooses his cause of
action when filing his complaint.
One can still classify the doctrine of equivalents as equitable,
209

See id.
The solution of removing the two-year limitation on broadening claims in a
reissue was proposed by Martin J. Adelman and Gary L. Francione:
The solution, however, is for Congress to repeal the two-year limitation and treat
broadening and narrowing reissues alike. The Federal Circuit has stated
that “[t]he purpose of the law that a broadening reissue must be
applied for within two years after patent grant is to set a limited time
after which the public may rely on the scope of the claims of an issued
patent.” As long as the doctrine of intervening rights is enforced
rigorously, however, the public will not be harmed by broadening
reissues over the life of the patent. Moreover, whatever greater
uncertainty would result from liberalizing the reissue rules would be
more than offset by a decrease in the uncertainty engendered by use of
the doctrine of equivalents.
Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine Of Equivalents In Patent Law:
Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 720 (1989) (emphasis
added).
211
35 U.S.C. § 271 is the patent infringement statute.
212
See Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 318 F.3d 1143, 1148 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citing Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
210
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however, even if the jury decides infringement under the doctrine.
The jury had been deciding literal infringement, so allowing the jury
to decide infringement under the doctrine of equivalents was a
213
natural progression.
Further, since infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents is analogous to reformation (the jury is
essentially rewriting the existing claims in order to find infringement
in a particular instance), the doctrine of equivalents is better
214
characterized as an equitable remedy.
Even if one cannot strictly
classify the doctrine of equivalents as “equitable,” it may not be
strictly “legal” because the Patent Act created a legal remedy – the
215
reissue.
Thus, by analogy, the doctrine falls within the general
principle that one must avail himself of his available legal remedy
first, before resorting to an extra legal remedy. More importantly,
the doctrine of equivalents is a dangerous doctrine and restrictions of
its use are consistent with recent case law.
CONCLUSION
However the doctrine of equivalents is classified, whether merely
“extra” legal or specifically as equitable, it has potential for being
abused. In the egregious case where the patentee has specific
knowledge of a non-literal infringement and willfully does not seek a
reissue, as in Wilson Sporting Goods, Johnson & Johnston, WarnerJenkinson, Lemelson, and Athletic Alternatives, courts should further
restrict the doctrine of equivalents to promote what it was intended
216
to promote – fairness.

213

See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(explaining that the jury decides “disputed factual questions of what the patent
covered”).
214
See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
215
35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
216
See supra notes 156-204 and accompanying text.

